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Reformation efforts in all aspects of intelligence operations have taken place since the 
inception of the U.S. Intelligence Community yet have been largely based on conventional 
methods of warfare. This trend continues into the use of intelligence activities in military 
operations as joint intelligence doctrine and operations also focus on conventional threats 
rather than taking into account the asymmetric adversary that is commonly faced today. These 
circumstances, along with previous studies into the subject, have pinpointed the essential need 
to maximize U.S. national security resources and assets, especially those related to military 
intelligence operations.  
 
Recent efforts have facilitated better integration and coordination in and among both the 
Intelligence Community and Military Intelligence entities through the process of reach back 
intelligence and the use of Joint Intelligence Centers; however, there are further actions to be 
commenced in the benefit of U.S. national security. This study will employ qualitative 
measures of exploratory analysis in order to identify areas of weakness in organizational 
structure and doctrine while advancing efforts of efficiency and success of Joint Intelligence 
Centers concerning the asymmetric threat.  
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STATEMENT OF TOPIC AREA 
In this new age of asymmetric and unconventional warfare, intelligence is commonly 
considered to be synonymous with national security. The increasingly common threat of 
terrorist organizations to our direct security, along with the tertiary threat of insurgency 
toward the U.S. and its foreign allies, have proven to be too disseminated to subdue 
completely and too fanatical to disband wholly. The most promising opportunity for 
successful national security is a combined effort of the U.S. Intelligence Community (IC) and 
military forces through judicious and accessible intelligence provided through the process of 
reach back intelligence by Joint Intelligence Centers (JICs), not only paired with actionable 
analyses and provided to those operating at the operational and tactical levels, but also 
current and comprehensive parameters of such operations as outlined at the strategic level.  
Use of the IC and its elements by JICs must be organized and detailed by requirements of a 
mission set rather than that of just a collection mechanism in order to fully exploit its 
technical and analytic aptitude in contributing to tactical operations. This revelation has 
brought about not only an apparent need in the operation of the JIC for standard, periodic 
assessment of procedure, doctrine, and organization in order to more concertedly and 
effectively assist military forces in addressing current national security needs, but it also 
highlights the limitations that operating on outdated structure can place on U.S. tactical  




operations. It emphasizes the significance of keeping all methods of operations including the 
process of reach back intelligence current and the consequences of allowing elements of the 
process to become outdated.  
PURPOSE OF STUDY  
In order to fully understand the complexities involved in preparing military intelligence 
entities to support military operations and successfully face the asymmetric threat, one must 
first analyze and understand the history of the Joint Intelligence Center (JIC), the general 
practice of the reach back intelligence process, and the joint doctrinal guidelines that directly 
affect these resources. This exploratory study will highlight the issues that lie in the current 
usage of these resources and techniques and what difficulties may exist in changing these 
measures, especially highlighting issues between the integration of the intelligence 
community, military intelligence, and various military branches. 
The study of intelligence operations, along with military intelligence operations, is 
critical in refining the policies, tactics, and procedures for future intelligence activity. It is 
through the study and reassessment of current policies and activities revolving around the use 
of reach back intelligence and the engagement of asymmetric enemies, that we can look 
toward the future and determine the best course of action involving subsequent 
recommendations of change. It is the goal of this paper to expand on previous efforts of joint 
intelligence as it related to the use of JICs and reach back intelligence and redirect focus to a 
higher strategic level to better integrate the IC into the military realm and do so in a manner 
that benefits modern national security realities of the asymmetric threat. This should be done 
using methods that lay groundwork for the entirety of the U.S. military force to conduct 
3 
 
intelligence-based operations in a manner that coincides with, but is not based solely on, 
Special Operations Forces (SOF). This action should assist in placing intelligence and 
national security defense assets, including that of both at-home agencies and military forces, 
to better use through an enhanced and more efficient process of reach back intelligence 


















CHAPTER II  
 
 
BACKGROUND / LITERARY REVIEW 
 
 
THE ASYMMETRIC THREAT DEFINED 
 Although the official term ‘asymmetric threat’ is quite new, the ideas that the term 
encompasses are as ‘old as warfare itself’.1 Many strategic theorists have touched on the 
topic within their writings throughout the course of history. Sun Tzu is perhaps one of the 
most notable proponents of asymmetric attack and stated that: “All warfare is based on 
deception. When confronted with an enemy, one should offer the enemy a bait to lure him; 
feign disorder and strike him. When he concentrates, prepare against him; where he is 
strong, avoid him”. 2 Strategic theorists from B.H Liddle Hart to Edward Luttwak have 
generalized rules of warfare based on the idea of exploiting an adversary’s weaknesses in 
unconventional manners. In operational history, historical military leaders from Genghis 
Khan to Joan of Arc have exhibited measures of asymmetric strategy within their tactical 
military strategy.3 
 The first official mention of the term “asymmetric warfare” was in a publication of 
Joint Doctrine in 1995 as it defined asymmetric engagements as those between dissimilar 
forces, specifically in instances of air versus land, sea versus land, etc.4 As such, the concept 
                                               
1 Steven Metz and Douglas Johnson II, Asymmetry And U.S. Military Strategy: Definition, Background, And 
Strategic Concepts, eBook (repr., Carlisle, PA: Strategic Army War College, 2001), 
http://ssi.armywarcollege.edu/pdffiles/PUB223.pdf. 
2 Bin Sun, Ken Langdon and Karen McCreadie, Sun Tzu's The Art Of War (Oxford: Infinite Ideas, 2008). 
3 Steven Metz and Douglas Johnson II, Asymmetry And U.S. Military Strategy: Definition, Background, And 
Strategic Concepts, eBook (repr., Carlisle, PA: Strategic Army War College, 2001), 
http://ssi.armywarcollege.edu/pdffiles/PUB223.pdf. 
4 Dan Daley, Asymmetric Warfare: The Only Thing New Is The Tactics, eBook (Washington D.C.: National 
War College, 2000), http://www.dtic.mil/dtic/tr/fulltext/u2/a433588.pdf. 
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of asymmetry was presented in an incredibly narrow sense until the 1995 National Military 
Strategy broadened the definition listing other means of threat as asymmetric threat including 
that of terrorism, weapons of mass destruction (WMD), and information warfare.5 Once 
acknowledged officially by military entities, it was not long before the entirety of the IC and 
other agencies involved in foreign affairs began to approach the concept of asymmetric 
warfare as a topic of utmost importance. The concept of asymmetry began to appear in 
official strategy documents across intelligence, military, and policy community agencies in 
order to address the issue and begin study and development of strategy and doctrine in order 
to help prevent attack from an asymmetric front as well as launch offensives using our own 
asymmetric capabilities.  
 In 1999, the Joint Strategy Review provided what was, to-date, the broadest official 
conceptualization of asymmetric adversary stating: “Asymmetric approaches are the attempts 
to circumvent or undermine U.S. strengths while exploiting U.S. weaknesses using methods 
that differ significantly from the United States’ expected method of operations. [Asymmetric 
approaches] generally seek a major psychological impact, such as shock or confusion that 
affects an opponent’s initiative, freedom of action, or will. Asymmetric methods require an 
appreciation of an opponent’s vulnerabilities. Asymmetric approaches often employ 
innovative, nontraditional tactics, weapons, or technologies, and can be applied at all levels 
of warfare- strategic, operational, and tactical- and across the spectrum of military 
operations.”.6 
                                               
5 Steven Metz and Douglas Johnson II, Asymmetry And U.S. Military Strategy: Definition, Background, And 
Strategic Concepts, eBook (repr., Carlisle, PA: Strategic Army War College, 2001), 
http://ssi.armywarcollege.edu/pdffiles/PUB223.pdf. 
6 Rod Thornton, Asymmetric Warfare (Cambridge: Polity Press, 2008). 
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 While this definition expanded on the concept of asymmetric adversary, it has been 
pointed out that it has two glaring shortcomings. First of all, it remains specific to the 
strategic environment and national security scenario of the time of its inception. Secondly, it 
only seems to deal with what is referred to as negative asymmetry. Negative symmetry is the 
understanding and acknowledgement of what action an adversary may take against the U.S. 
but does not take into account the asymmetric action that the U.S. may employ against its 
adversaries.7  
The CIA defines asymmetric warfare as “The use of innovative strategies, tactics, and 
technologies by a ‘weaker’ state or sub-state adversary that are intended to avoid the 
strengths and exploit the potential vulnerabilities of larger and technologically superior 
opponents. This includes: 
• The selective use of weapons or military resources by a state or sub-state group to 
counter, deter, or possibly defeat a numerically or technologically superior force. 
• The use of diplomatic and other non-military resources or tactics by a state or sub-
state group to discourage or constrain military operations by a superior force.”8 
The DoD defines asymmetric warfare in simpler terms. In the DoD definition which 
was formulated by the Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS), asymmetric warfare should be considered 
“attempts to circumvent or undermine an opponent’s strengths while exploiting his 
weaknesses using methods that differ significantly from the opponent’s usual mode of 
                                               
7 Steven Metz and Douglas Johnson II, Asymmetry And U.S. Military Strategy: Definition, Background, And 
Strategic Concepts, eBook (repr., Carlisle, PA: Strategicd Army War College, 2001), 
http://ssi.armywarcollege.edu/pdffiles/PUB223.pdf. 
8 Ashton B. Carter and William J. Perry, Countering Asymmetric Threats, eBook (Washington D.C.: The 
Brookings Institution, 1999), https://www.belfercenter.org/sites/default/files/legacy/files/kte_ch5.pdf. 
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operations”.9 The U.S. Army War College even further simplifies this definition as it refers 
to asymmetric warfare as strategic asymmetry, or “the use of some sort of difference to gain 
an advantage over an enemy”.10 
Perhaps the most detailed conceptualization of asymmetric warfare was defined by 
Steven Metz and Douglas Johnson in a report for the Army War College as it describes 
strategic asymmetry in the following manner: “In the realm of military affairs and national 
security, asymmetry is acting, organizing, and thinking differently than opponents in order to 
maximize one’s own advantages, exploit an opponent’s weaknesses, attain the initiative, or 
gain greater freedom of action. It can be political-strategic, military-strategic, operational, 
or a combination of these. It can entail different methods, technologies, values, 
organizations, time perspectives, or some combination of these. It can be short-term or long-
term. It can be deliberate or by default. It can be discrete or pursued in conjunction with 
symmetric approaches. It can have both psychological and physical dimensions.” 11 
Regardless of the official definition provided by a particular agency or branch 
representative, all definitions of the term asymmetric warfare include the same primary 
factors- 
• The use of unconventional and inventive methods of attack and/or defense 
• Disproportionate effect in military or financial investment 
                                               
9 Ashton B. Carter and William J. Perry, Countering Asymmetric Threats, eBook (Washington D.C.: The 
Brookings Institution, 1999), https://www.belfercenter.org/sites/default/files/legacy/files/kte_ch5.pdf. 
10 Steven Metz and Douglas Johnson II, Asymmetry And U.S. Military Strategy: Definition, Background, And 
Strategic Concepts, eBook (repr., Carlisle, PA: Strategic Army War College, 2001), 
http://ssi.armywarcollege.edu/pdffiles/PUB223.pdf. 
11 Steven Metz and Douglas Johnson II, Asymmetry And U.S. Military Strategy: Definition, Background, And 




• Use of exhibited strengths against the organizational weaknesses of one’s 
enemies12 
THE JOINT-INTELLIGENCE CENTER: A BRIEF HISTORY 
 While the concept of a joint intelligence center had been thinly addressed for some 
time, the official initiative of a joint intelligence center did not arise until somewhat recently. 
In 1942, in response to the probability of active operations in the Pacific arena, an U.S. 
Marine Corps commandant made an official proposal for such an organization highlighting 
the need for integrated intelligence efforts amongst military branches.13 This proposal was 
acknowledged yet did not provoke any implementation until several months later, with the 
creation of an intelligence center at Pearl Harbor. This facility would eventually become the 
first veritable JIC- the Joint Intelligence Center/Pacific Ocean Area (JICPOA).14 
The primary dynamic leading to the Pearl Harbor Intelligence Center’s transition to 
the JICPOA was the tragic event of Pearl Harbor itself and the causal intelligence failures 
that led to the tragedy.  Other factors played key roles in the evolution of the JIC at this point 
as well. World War II had once again forced U.S. military operations to transition from 
fundamentally defensive operational tactics to offensive operations and helped to 
demonstrate an essential need for integration and inter-service cooperation amongst the 
different military branches, as well as a reliance on intelligence products derived from IC 
                                               
12 Military Intelligence, Intelligence Studies, Intelligence Operations, National Intelligence, Intelligence 
Analysis, Gateway to Intelligence. 1. accessed February 2019. https://www.au.af.mil/au/awc/awcgate/awc-
ntel.htm 
13 Military Intelligence, Intelligence Studies, Intelligence Operations, National Intelligence, Intelligence 
Analysis, Gateway to Intelligence. 1. accessed February 2019. https://www.au.af.mil/au/awc/awcgate/awc-
ntel.htm 
14 Military Intelligence, Intelligence Studies, Intelligence Operations, National Intelligence, Intelligence 




agencies domestically.15 The resulting shift in emphasis from smaller-scale, special 
operations to that of large-scale joint operations throughout the Pacific further underscored 
the need for collaborative intelligence efforts.  
Another major contributing factor to the projected need of joint intelligence 
operations was the increase in availability of new intelligence sources. The increase in 
military operations throughout the Pacific naturally increased the volume of intelligence-
based sources including seized documents, prisoners used in interrogation procedures, and 
other forms of raw data.16 The compartmentalized system of intelligence operations that 
existed up to this point could not effectively or efficiently handle this influx of intelligence, 
as its framework would lead to further duplication of effort, intra-service competition, issues 
in resource allocation, errors in dissemination, and inconsistent analysis and assessment.17 
With the end of the war came the inevitable organizational downsizing that takes 
place after the dissolution of any largescale conflict. Intelligence organizations such as the 
JICPOA and other joint intelligence operational units were trimmed from the budget and 
eliminated. The next forty years of JIC progression was interwoven with efforts synergize 
DOD and the U.S. IC.18 This led to in-battling between military branches as some military-
related organizations (i.e. the War Department) supports the expansion and centralization of 
the JIC as associated with the JCS, while others (i.e. Secretary of Naval Command) opposed 
                                               
15 Report of Intelligence Activities in the Pacific Ocean Areas, report, Archives, Joint Forces Staff College, US 
Pacific and Pacific Ocean Areas. 
16 Report of Intelligence Activities in the Pacific Ocean Areas, report, Archives, Joint Forces Staff College, US 
Pacific and Pacific Ocean Areas. 
17 Military Intelligence, Intelligence Studies, Intelligence Operations, National Intelligence, Intelligence 
Analysis, Gateway to Intelligence. 1. accessed February 2019. https://www.au.af.mil/au/awc/awcgate/awc-
ntel.htm 




these efforts, further intensifying interservice and cross-branch issues of command and 
control of resources.19 
As a compromise, Joint Intelligence Divisions (JID) were created to direct focus on 
the standardization of procedural methods and to assist in the prevention of effort duplication 
among the services. The overall goal of the JID was to emphasize support and cohesiveness 
among the various intelligence factions of the military branches while leaving the core of the 
intelligence cycle procedures to the service components of the individual branches.20 A full 
revival of the JIC, while acknowledged in discussion of organizational change as a 
replacement and better alternative to the JID, would not appear for several decades.  
Over this period of time there were other changes and progressions taking place in the 
realm of defense intelligence as well. Focus of defense intelligence (to be noted, this does not 
refer to intelligence operations as a whole, but that which is labeled specifically defense 
intelligence) was steered away from overall military planning and beginning to focus more 
on the support of operational forces.21  Further adjustments were being followed through as a 
more thorough result of the Goldwater-Nichols Act leading to a refinement of the Defense 
Intelligence Agency’s (DIA) role as a military intelligence organization in better response of 
declining funding and the rapidly changing nature of the global threat.22  
                                               
19 Edward M. Coffman, Allan R. Millett, and Peter Maslowski, "For the Common Defense: A Military History 
of the United States of America.," Military Affairs 50, no. 1 (1986): , doi:10.2307/1988538. 
20 Coffman, Edward M., Allan R. Millett, and Peter Maslowski. "For the Common Defense: A Military History 
of the United States of America." Military Affairs50, no. 1 (1986): 51. doi:10.2307/1988538. 
21 McDonnell, Janet A. Adapting to a Changing Environment: Defense Intelligence Agency in the 1990s. DIA 
Historical Research Division. Defense Intelligence Historical Perspectives. 2013. 
http://www.dia.mil/Portals/27/Documents/About/History/HistoricalPerspectiveVol3_Web.pdf. 
22 McDonnell, Janet A. Adapting to a Changing Environment: Defense Intelligence Agency in the 1990s. DIA 





OPERATION DESERT STORM AND THE RE-EMERGENCE OF THE JOINT 
INTELLIGENCE CENTER 
The DIA, in order to improve management of military intelligence resources, as to 
help consolidate multiple efforts, went through a period of restructure during the Gulf War. 
As such, Operation Desert Storm marked a resurgence in the use of the JIC concept. The use 
of JICs had been a long-suggested method for intelligence operations; yet oddly, regardless 
of the realization of its importance, the use of JICs was not a widely accepted practice to use 
these centers until after the Gulf War. This is not to say that the idea was completely 
disregarded prior to this point. During World War II, JICs were used in several theaters of 
operation; however, their use was not recorded in detail until the period of the Gulf War, 
causing most scholarly study that has been performed in the area to be conducted from this 
point forward and leaving its years of infancy largely unexamined.   
The factors associated with the Gulf War at both the geopolitical and social levels 
were designed in such a way to further facilitate the re-emergence of JICs into the military 
intelligence theater. As Hussein’s military structure presented itself much like a “miniature 
version of the Soviet Army in equipment, doctrine, and tactics”, the threat presented itself in 
conventional terms, with the exposition of a symmetric military force. Therefore, the U.S. 
was able to use its expertise in the area of Air-Land Battle Doctrine, a tactic U.S. forces had 
actively been training for since the 1970s, in order to quickly and efficiently contain and 
minimize the threat in the Gulf.23 Considering this was the type of warfare that we had 
focused resources and training in since the IC’s inception, Operation Desert Storm as it was 
                                               




called, was quickly successful and U.S. and coalition forces were victorious in minimizing 
the threat of Hussein’s regime for the time being. While Operation Desert Storm was a 
battlefield success, it also served as a reminder of the dominance of U.S. military forces in 
conventional terms, encouraging other regimes and sub-state forces to begin to contemplate 
an increase in the use of unconventional and asymmetric tactics in engaging and attacking the 
security of the U.S. 
Despite the success of strategic and tactical operations during Operation Desert 
Storm, the IC caught its share of criticism on an operational level once again. During a post-
operational testimony before Congress, General Normal Schwarzkopf criticized the efforts of 
the IC during the operation, highlighting a “breakdown in the integration of national 
intelligence and military forces”.24 He attributed this breakdown to fragmented preparation, 
poor communication activity, and a deficiency in knowledge and understanding of the 
operational environment that the mission set contained.25 Also contributing to the return of 
the JIC was the implementation of the 1986 Goldwater-Nichols Act.26 By increasing the 
power of the Chairman to the JCS as a principal military adviser, and granting combatant 
commanders more autonomy and authority, the Goldwater-Nichols Act successfully 
generated an organizational structure requirement best met by JIC development.27 
                                               
24 David Oakley, "Adapting To Change: Strategic Turning Points And The CIA/Dod Relationship", Interagency 
Journal 5, no. 1 (2014), http://thesimonscenter.org/wp-content/uploads/2014/03/IAJ-5-1Winter-2014-3-11.pdf. 
25 David Oakley, "Adapting To Change: Strategic Turning Points And The CIA/Dod Relationship", Interagency 
Journal 5, no. 1 (2014), http://thesimonscenter.org/wp-content/uploads/2014/03/IAJ-5-1Winter-2014-3-11.pdf. 
26 "The Evolution And Relevance Of Joint Intelligence Centers — Central Intelligence Agency", Cia.Gov, 
2018, https://www.cia.gov/library/center-for-the-study-of-intelligence/csi-publications/csi-
studies/studies/vol49no1/html_files/the_evolution_6.html. 





During the Gulf War, JICs were successfully implemented at both the national and 
theater levels. The DoD Joint Intelligence Center (later renamed the National Military Joint 
Intelligence Center) was established in August 1990 in order to provide a “single, integrated 
DoD intelligence position to national decision-makers and the theater commander”.28 
Providing a much-needed bridge between the military intelligence and IC agency 
communities, the use of JICs was further implemented amongst CENTCOM units and 
established at each of the theater commands. This requisite, along with the aforementioned 
Goldwater-Nichols Act, created a state of affairs that ensured that the use of JICs would not 
fade away as in previous implementations, but would rather become an integral part of 
military intelligence and IC operations.  
The successful implantation of JICs during the Gulf War did not mean that the use of 
such entities was without its own share of challenges. Several studies into the use of JICs at 
this time, as well as noted statements from key players in the conflict, point to several 
dilemmas within its operations. Perhaps the most mentioned problem of the use of the JIC 
during Operation Desert Storm was in its developmental operational procedures. As the use 
of JICs was only implemented as an effort to streamline analysis and dissemination during 
the planning phase of Desert Storm, it was done so quickly and inefficiently, leaving its 
organizational nature “loose and largely informal”, limiting its efficiency and effectiveness 
and creating strain in the military community and IC relationship.29 Tensions between the 
military community and the IC were further exacerbated by the use of JICs in the analysis of 
                                               
28 "The Evolution And Relevance Of Joint Intelligence Centers — Central Intelligence Agency", Cia.Gov, 
2018, https://www.cia.gov/library/center-for-the-study-of-intelligence/csi-publications/csi-
studies/studies/vol49no1/html_files/the_evolution_6.html. 
29 David Oakley, "Adapting To Change: Strategic Turning Points And The CIA/Dod Relationship", Interagency 
Journal 5, no. 1 (2014), http://thesimonscenter.org/wp-content/uploads/2014/03/IAJ-5-1Winter-2014-3-11.pdf. 
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battle damage assessments, as the two groups disagreed upon the nature of these reports and 
the IC was perceived as supporting the military operations poorly.30 Poor intelligence support 
was an issue commonly referenced in other discussion and critiques of Operation Desert 
Storm as well. Other Congressional reports panned the CIA specifically as exhibiting 
inadequacy in its support role towards the JIC. The CIA was denunciated as demonstrating a 
“hands-off approach” that failed to unify an adequate intelligence picture of the scenario 
exhibited in the mission set.31 
In response to the criticisms of the functionality of the JICs during Desert Storm, the 
DoD established permanent JICs at the Combatant-Command level.32 To parallel this 
improvement, the IC, in turn, established non-permanent national support teams, groups of 
subject matter experts and IC analysts that would come together in periods of need in order to 
support joint task forces during operations.33 The CIA also extended effort to improve 
intelligence support operations by developing crisis operation liaison teams to better provide 
military commanders access to CIA realm products and to better integrate CIA and DoD 
operations.34 
Demonstrating an alacrity to go beyond the role of support to the policymaker that the 
IC is required to hold, the CIA went a step further to help bridge the gap between IC and 
                                               
30 David Oakley, "Adapting To Change: Strategic Turning Points And The CIA/Dod Relationship", Interagency 
Journal 5, no. 1 (2014), http://thesimonscenter.org/wp-content/uploads/2014/03/IAJ-5-1Winter-2014-3-11.pdf. 
31 David Oakley, "Adapting To Change: Strategic Turning Points And The CIA/Dod Relationship", Interagency 
Journal 5, no. 1 (2014), http://thesimonscenter.org/wp-content/uploads/2014/03/IAJ-5-1Winter-2014-3-11.pdf. 
32 "The Evolution And Relevance Of Joint Intelligence Centers — Central Intelligence Agency", Cia.Gov, 
2018, https://www.cia.gov/library/center-for-the-study-of-intelligence/csi-publications/csi-
studies/studies/vol49no1/html_files/the_evolution_6.html. 
33 David Oakley, "Adapting To Change: Strategic Turning Points And The CIA/Dod Relationship", Interagency 
Journal 5, no. 1 (2014), http://thesimonscenter.org/wp-content/uploads/2014/03/IAJ-5-1Winter-2014-3-11.pdf. 
34 David Oakley, "Adapting To Change: Strategic Turning Points And The CIA/Dod Relationship", Interagency 
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DoD activity at this time through its establishment of the Office of Military Affairs (OMA). 
This office was created in an effort to “enhance information flow and increase cooperation” 
amongst the military community and the IC. This increased the mission of the IC to provide 
support to military operations when the need arises, identifying military agencies as another 
‘customer’ to the products that the IC disseminates.35 This office, along with the CIA 
Associate Director of Central Intelligence for Military Support were consolidated into the 
Office of the Associate Director of Military Affairs (ADMA) after the events of 9/11.36 
POST 9/11 CHANGES 
“I am not opposed to intelligence reform on its face, but any changes should reflect 
the current context”.37 These words, uttered by Ted Stevens during the proceedings and 
debates of the second session of the 108th Congress, reflects an opinion shared by a large part 
of Western society in a post-9/11 world.38 Prior to 9/11, our nation’s intelligence agencies 
remained poised for a single, traditional enemy. There was an intrinsic need to adapt to a 
post-Cold War threat environment.39 The 9/11 attacks accelerated efforts to “transform the 
orientation of intelligence services from rivalry, both domestic and international, to 
cooperation against the new threats”.40 This was an unprecedented situation for intelligence 
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services, domestic, military, and overseas alike, where considerations of secrecy, trust, and 
national security made them the strongest bulwark of sovereignty. The events of 9/11 not 
only brought the CIA and DoD relationship back to the forefront of consideration, but also 
the entire IC into the spotlight of critique and review. It exacerbated the fact that while our IC 
remained prepared for conventional/symmetric adversary, its organizational structure and 
procedural doctrine was lacking in response to that of an unconventional/asymmetric threat.   
Perhaps the most widespread and well-known instance of reformation stemming from 
9/11 affecting military intelligence operations was the passage of the Intelligence Reform and 
Terrorism Prevention Act (IRTPA) of 2004. This reformation act is highly considered to be a 
“decade’s effort to coordinate the work of military and intelligence agencies that used to 
compete”. 41 The passage of the IRTPA forced intelligence agencies to share information 
amongst one another, finally centralizing the process to some degree and allowing a further 
level of integration among agencies within the IC, further benefitting military intelligence 
activities that derive part of their data from these arenas. The National Counterterrorism 
Center (NCTC) was created with the IRTPA, setting up a joint command structure across the 
entirety of the intelligence agencies and establishing guidelines for new information sharing 
measures benefitting the JICs in avenues of collection.42 The new emphasis on information 
sharing and the reorganizational measures that resulted also led to a significant application of 
resources.43 Other important provisions of the IRTPA included: the National Crime 
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Prevention Council (NCPC), and the Joint Intelligence Community Council (JICC); 
establishment of an “information sharing environment”, creating a Privacy and Civil 
Liberties Oversight Board, and mandating that service be required in multiple agencies of the 
IC as a condition of promotion to specific positions.44 
As it stands in its modern-day construct, the JIC operates as the principal organization 
in each Combatant Command as a Joint Intelligence Operations Center (JIOC). JIOCs were 
established in 2006, based much on the model of the JIC, as DIA organizations conducting 
all avenues of intelligence planning, collection, analysis, and dissemination procedures under 
the control and authority of their respective Combatant Commanders.45  Resource allocation 
and oversight is provided to JIOCs through the Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for 
Intelligence [USD(I)], offering the JIOC a set of stipulated assignments to be performed by 
task-organized teams of specialists.46 These specialists are comprised from various 
intelligence disciplines with the specific constituents of each team being adapted as needs 
change.  
THE REACH BACK INTELLIGENCE PROCESS AND JOINT INTELLIGENCE 
DOCTRINE 
Overall, joint doctrine defines intelligence as a “product resulting from the collection, 
processing, integration, analysis, evaluation, and interpretation of available information 
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concerning foreign countries or areas”.47 As it stands, joint intelligence doctrine focuses 
primarily on combat operations and getting Joint Force Commanders (JFCs)  intelligence 
products concerning the battlespace and adversary in question in times of war and in Military 
Operations Other Than War (MOOTW).48 It is used in combat situations to support 
operations and in MOOTW to determine when and where conflict may arise that may require 
U.S. military intervention. The Joint Intelligence Preparation of the Battlespace doctrine in 
JP 2-01.3 highlights the focus that most doctrinal requirements maintain on the conventional 
battlefield, as it is directed towards the “preparatory intelligence analysis for operations level 
force-on-force confrontations” in the conventional sense, rather than the asymmetric 
adversary our military forces face more commonly today.49  
This is important in our research as it is known that in both circumstances of when 
joint intelligence doctrine is used, it is often used in a process known as “reach back 
intelligence”. It is when furthering study on reach back intelligence that the underlying 
conventional conditions on which joint intelligence doctrine is based on becomes a matter of 
importance. 
The Joint Publication 3-30 defines reach back intelligence as the “process of 
obtaining products, services, and applications, or forces, or equipment, or material from 
organizations that are not forward deployed”.50 This process allows those in tactical and 
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operations fronts to ‘reach back’ to those on back end missions or in undeployed standing to 
assist in operations.51 This may involve assistance from both military intelligence entities and 
agencies within the IC. This process encourages the use of resources that are otherwise 
unavailable onsite in support and integration of advise and assist missions, as well as in 
operations of assessment.52 
The process of reach back intelligence support can be explained simply as it relies on 
a system of questions and answers. Within the reach back process, once a tactical unit 
identifies an area in which they could use supplementary intelligence to their own analytical 
information, they pose the question to a reach back support agency in order to seek assistance 
in the matter. This agency provides a team of analysts who address the problem through 
analysis of stored and collected intelligence data, creating a product that can be quickly and 
efficiently disseminated back to the unit in forward deployment.53 
 It is not difficult to understand why the use of reach back support and intelligence 
efforts are necessary in today’s operational environment. Prior to the emergence of official 
reach back procedures, it was the sole responsibility of company commanders to progress the 
ground situation through efforts such as patrol reports, atmospherics, and general situational 
awareness.54 Battalion level intelligence shops (i.e. S-2) took the initiative in the tracking and 
identification of patterns within adversarial groups in an effort to help drive targeting 
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operations, those of which are executed at the company level. A broader network analysis is 
then created in order to assist in the amalgamation of bringing a larger portion of the IC’s 
assets into use.  
While this method of intelligence procedure works in conflict with the conventional 
threat, it becomes less efficient within a fight involving insurgency or asymmetric 
adversaries. This is largely due to the speed at which the operational environment in which 
asymmetric conflict takes place begins to evolve; the decentralized structure of the insurgent 
organization as well as the consistent transformation of tactics, techniques, and procedures 
(TTP) involved help to contribute to this problem. This creates an even more difficult 
environment in which the various levels of military operations can sustain activity, requiring 
a more expedient and efficient method for the gathering and usage of intelligence assets.55 
The use of reach back intelligence support has increased substantially in recent years 
with the evolution of adversarial threats into asymmetric conflicts; therefore, a general 
understanding of the reach-back intelligence process is necessitated when analyzing any 
portion of military intelligence operations.  
Reach back intelligence is achieved through a common Request for Support (RFS). 
When the operational unit experiences a gap in intelligence, the S-2 must provide a RFS in 
order to initiate the reach back process; this request is provided to a geographically assigned 
Division Support Team (DST) located within the JIC or other reach back support agency [i.e. 
Joint Improvised Explosive Device Defeat Organization (JIEDDO), Joint Fusion and 
Analysis Center (JFAC), Counter-IED Operations Integration Center (COIC), etc.] through a 
                                               




secure and approved communications system such as the Secret Internet Protocol Router 
Network (SIPRNET). The DST take the request and begin to look through databases of 
previously collected data and intelligence analysis reports in order to see if the information is 
readily available for dissemination.56 Relevant information is then gathered and integrated 
into a product for dissemination and use in the specific operation from which it was 
requested. It is important to note there is no specific timeline for how long the reach back 
process is to take in response to the RFS; however, the goal of this action is to be as efficient 
and effective as possible to allow for tactical and operational activities on the ground to 














                                               











 Driven by the question “how could the joint intelligence center better support military 
intelligence operations, especially in the process of reach back intelligence”, this study must 
first answer several sub-questions. First, this study must establish what the current policy 
deficiencies are in relation to both IC and military intelligence operations against the 
asymmetric adversary, what organizational deficiencies are negatively affecting intelligence 
operations in both of these realms, and what corrections should be made in order to remedy 
these problems. Understanding the nature of the problem and necessary solutions are 
necessary prerequisites in the development and dissemination of recommendations regarding 
better organizational structure and processes in the realm of national security, military 
operations, and the asymmetric threat, specifically in the areas of the Joint Intelligence 
Center and its impact on reach back intelligence activities.  
 The methodology conducted in this study is a qualitative study based on retrospective 
historical exploratory analysis. Previously conducted reports and studies involving U.S. 
military intelligence activities have resulted in scholarly analyses to determine the impact of 
certain circumstances on military intelligence measures and reform. The current study is 
considered to be ‘retrospective’ in nature, as the effects have already been studied in previous 
works and are known; therefore, the researcher must look back in order to determine the 
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relation of previous events to the causes of the current standing of the JIC and its need for 
improvement.  
 By focusing study in this manner, a timeline for organizational efforts can be 
established based on the issues addressed in background and literary review in order to 
demonstrate the need for periodic assessment and adjustment within the JIC or the reach back 
intelligence process in order to more concertedly and efficiently address national security 
needs. Once the scope of previous reformation efforts is considered, this study can then begin 
to identify any other doctrinal reform and recommendations that must take place in order for 
the new strategy to achieve desired outcomes. 
It is at this point that the study transitions to a prospective approach as its aim 
changes to predict the effects of a change to the current situation in order to properly suggest 
recommendations in support of a better codification of policy against the asymmetric threat. 
To better provide such, the study must weigh the influence of such action against the 
limitations of current procedure. It is important to again note that this study is qualitative in 
nature and is therefore based on an open-ended and considered more subjective in nature than 
a quantitative approach to such a study would be. This type of research design best suits this 
type of qualitative study, as the issues that exist within the structure and integration of the 
JIC and military intelligence agencies are observable, but the underlying causes and future 
effects of action and/or inaction are both debatable in current context.  
SIGNIFICANCE, RATIONALE, AND PURPOSE 
 It is important to understand that while national-security challenges grow, and 
budgets decrease, the key to addressing these changes and remaining relevant within such an 
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open society is building a more efficient military intelligence operations structure while 
supporting it with proper guidelines backed by joint intelligence doctrine. It is proposed that 
the best course of action within intelligence reform and the fight against modern-day 
asymmetric threats lies directly in integration based on mission set, not only among the 
various agencies within the IC, but also amongst other prominent and associated groups and 
agencies, including DoD and tactical groups, that can directly impact national security 
measures. It is also proposed that current doctrinal support to tactical operations be revised in 
order to meet the needs of the current mission set. 
It is noted in preliminary findings that most policy and doctrine related to the 
asymmetric threat is dependent solely on SOF operations in a conventional warfare situation, 
yet today it is the entirety of our military and national security forces that faces the 
asymmetric threat. This study is intended to expand on previous efforts in this realm and 
redirect focus to the organizational and strategic level, bringing mission directives and 
authorizations into current context. The purpose of this study is to offer suggestions on how 
to better codify doctrine and practices through revision of current doctrine using methods that 
benefit and coincide with, but are not based solely on, Special Operation Forces; this is to be 
conducted through recommendations to the JIC structure and joint intelligence doctrinal 
guidelines related to reach back intelligence and asymmetric adversaries in effort to put 
intelligence and national security defense assets to better use, rather than formulate a 








 RESEARCH FINDINGS / DISCUSSION 
 
 
SUMMARY OF FINDINGS  
 The qualitative review of previously conducted reports and studies involving various 
aspects of intelligence and military operations has led to a better recognition and deeper 
understanding of the issues involved in various realms of the intelligence and military 
relationship. These issues must be addressed individually in order to make a better effort in 
the suggested recommendations towards policy revision and reformation regarding 
intelligence and military intelligence operations as they relate to U.S. national security and 
the fight against the asymmetric threat. It is hopeful that a more in-depth acknowledgement 
of the issues and weaknesses that exist in the current state of the intelligence – military  
relationship will also lead to suggestions for future research in the area and a recognition of 
more specific topics and questions that should be addressed and corrected in the future.  
This study was successful in identifying that there are definitive weaknesses and 
flaws in current intelligence and military intelligence operations that must be addressed in 
order to make more efficient and effective use of resources and assets associated with these 
operations. This study was also successful in identifying a small number specific areas of 
weakness and making suggested recommendations in order to increase the odds of success in 
operations against asymmetric threats. The reasons for the limited amount of findings based 




THE FUTURE OPERATIONAL ENVIRONMENT 
 The National Intelligence Council (NIC) has recently published works that help to 
project and estimate probable trends exhibited in today’s operational environment that will 
help to shape such in the future, providing world scenarios based on those prognostications. 
Within its work Global Trends 2030, it details four ‘megatrends’ that will impact the global 
operational theater greatly- individual empowerment, diffusion of power, demographic 
patterns, and the food, water, energy nexus.57 
 Based on its projections, individual empowerment will hasten through the use of 
widening means of communication and technology. This will help lead to the diffusion of 
power as power shifts in a multipolar world to networks and coalitions versus that of the 
previously prominent hegemonic authority. Both of these megatrends will contribute to the 
operation of asymmetric warfare mechanisms as it will allow the means to inflict damage that 
was only previously accessible by state actors while also increasing competition amongst 
nation-states who will turn to those activities in order to better shape outcomes to their 
favor.58 In order to best achieve viable solutions to long-standing issues, the possibilities that 
the asymmetric threat will continue to evolve and increase in scope, specifically within the 
multi-domain , must be considered. This will help to best keep any aspects of intelligence 
reform current and applicable to contemporary asymmetric operational scenarios. 
The projected operational environment is one that crosses several domains and 
therefore there are several factors that must be taken into account when conducting this level 
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of exploratory analysis to maintain a context for doctrine and organizational structure 
recommendations. The Department of Defense has focused efforts on developing doctrine 
that tackles the problem set that presents itself when adversaries are able to contest the joint 
force in all multiple domains.59 
 The forecasted operational environment, by nature, will be contested across all five 
domains (air, land, maritime, space, and cyberspace) and will require a comprehensive and 
joint response from the intelligence community. Examples of this multi-domain operational 
environment can be gleaned from current conflicts around the globe. Specifically, the conflict 
in the Donbass region of the Ukraine provides a glimpse of what near-peer multi-domain 
conflict will look like and the devastating effects it can have. Russia has used a variety of 
techniques and tactics in each domain and is consistently innovating new ways to use the 
domains to gain an advantage.  
This multi-domain initiative was put on display July 11, 2014 outside the village of 
Zelenopillya, A brigade of armored Ukrainian forces were consolidating gains after a 
successful offensive operation against separatists in the area. The Ukrainian armored units 
were preparing to begin an enforcement operation along the Ukrainian/Russian border that 
aimed to cut the separatists off from their Russian support areas. Utilizing unmanned aerial 
systems (UAS), the separatists were able to identify and relay the location of several columns 
of Ukrainian armor to Russian artillery and rocket units.60 Russia’s prosecution of the 
Ukrainian armor forces was devastatingly lethal, essentially neutralizing an entire Ukrainian 
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Armored Brigade in under three minutes. Estimated by analysts to have taken less than 15 
minutes from the time the separatists passed the target locations using off-the-shelf drones to  
the time that conventional uniformed Russian forces fired their multi-launch rocket system 
(MLRS) with dual-purpose improved conventional munition (DPICM), anti-tank 
submunitions, and thermobaric explosives.61 The ability of the separatists to use readily 
accessible technology to assist the Russians in mass destruction seems rudimentary, yet in 
practice is an extremely sophisticated and deliberate operation. It is important to note that in 
this particular instance, the Russian-backed targeting process took place across three 
domains; air, land, and cyber.   
The attack at Zelenopillya, along with subsequent Russian attacks, has shown that this 
event was not an anomaly. In fact, it is proving to a be a continuation in a trend upward of 
multi-domain warfare. The ability for adversaries to coordinate attacks across all five 
domains is a constant threat in the current operational environment.  
Another specific example drawn from the Ukrainian conflict is the ability of Russian 
supported separatists to leverage their advantage in four of the five domains to engage the 
Ukrainian military. In a particularly diabolical method, the separatists used the 
cyber/electronic domain to send text messages to the Ukrainian military that they had been 
surrounded. Subsequently, they sent messages to the families of Ukrainian units that they 
were targeting; these messages stated that the families’ loved ones had died and were 
remitted with the intent of either party generating phone traffic with the other. Russians then 
leveraged their assets that can collect on the cyber and electronic domain to gauge the spike 
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in electrometric signature in the suspected Ukrainian unit locations.62 Using UAS, the 
Russian’s engaged the Ukrainians with an artillery strike. This effort of targeting mirrors the 
U.S. Army’s targeting process Decide, Detect, Delivery, and Assess (D3A) and shows a 
sophistication and willingness to leverage asymmetric tactics and techniques to engage 
targets.63 This multi-domain operational environment provides almost unlimited 
combinations for adversaries to gain advantages. Therefore, it becomes critical that the joint 
intelligence community develop methods and institutions that can process data collected 
from each of the five domains.  
MILITARY INTELLIGENCE OPERATIONS AND JOINT INTELLIGENCE 
CENTERS IN THE FIGHT AGAINST THE ASYMMETRIC ADVERSARY 
 The process of reach back intelligence and the increased use of the JIC in support of 
reach back activities are a fairly new approach to today’s unconventional threats. The ability 
of intelligence entities within the military, specifically that of S-2, to meet the expectations of 
battalion commanders has become increasingly difficult with the increasing decentralization 
of our adversaries. Reach back intelligence support helps to bridge this gap by providing 
operational military forces another prospect for gathering and use of national IC assets. This 
information can be used to assess and assist in current situations within tactical intelligence 
operations, specifically as it relates to military intelligence activity.64 
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 In a recent qualitative report of the success of reach back intelligence operations, the 
Joint Improvised Explosive Device Defeat Organization (JIEDDO) and the later-conceived 
Counter-IED operations Integration Center (COIC) were studied to see how the use of reach-
back support effected operations directly related to Improvised Explosive Devices (IEDs). 
This report took a closer look at the process as it related to JIEDDO and COIC operations 
and identified how RFS and intelligence products may vary according to immediate need; 
this type of research is useful when examining the influence of reach-back support on the 
fight against the asymmetric threat, as IEDs contribute to the TTP and operational 
environment provided by insurgency and asymmetric adversaries. JIEDDO was created in 
2003 by the DoD in an effort to “defeat the IED as a weapon of strategic influence”.65 The 
creation of JIEDDO only led to further evolution of the TTP of use of the IED as an 
insurgency weapon; therefore in 2006, JIEDDO created the COIC in order to add a realm of 
intelligence support to the tactical activity that it already provided. COIC operates much like 
a JIC in its use of RFS and its process for analysis and dissemination of collected data in 
support of forward deployed operations. Intelligence data is used in this process in an effort 
to establish patterns and trends of insurgencies to those on the front lines for use in tactical 
operations.   
 The report determined that RFS to COIC would most likely vary according to a 
multitude of factors involved in a particular hostile situation. A unit who is has left its 
“traditional area of responsibility” will request this type of support in order to gain a better 
understanding of the new operational environment; this typically means that the type of RFS 
                                               




from neoteric tactical units will differ from RFS that come from established and matured 
units, who in turn have helped to provide much needed atmospherics to COIC for future 
support activity.66 The longer standing units’ requests differ in that they are not usually sent 
as an appeal for initial battlefield preparation, but rather are necessitated as a way to bridge 
gaps in their own intelligence data.67 
  The report also points to RSF that are in response to immediate need based on 
significant happenings that may arise on the battlefield. RSF of this nature are designed to 
acquire immediate intelligence data in relation to the area and circumstances surrounding the 
attack itself.  For example, an attack on U.S. forces by an insurgency group (i.e. U.S. casualty 
due to IED attack) may require intelligence on ingress/egress routes from the attack. This 
results in what is known as a ‘surge’ of intelligence by the COIC to turn stored data and 
information into immediately actionable intelligence.68 The report also reflects on the ease in 
which the COIC can be used in its support of military forces on the ground. The SIPRNET is 
used for the majority of its RSF through various and useful apparatus that are available 
through agency-ran secure sites.  
 Modern day joint intelligence operations and its role in military operations is 
currently outlined in JP-2_01. This doctrine outlines the objective of such operations in its 
support of military operations to provide an understanding of the operational environment 
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through the timely provision of accurate intelligence to commanders.69 Current joint 
intelligence operations not only focus on support of forward deployed units, but also 
maintain intelligence activities in informational operations, cyberspace operations, and in 
further examination of a multitude of factors that affect operational environments. This 
enables it to serve as “the single focal point for crisis intelligence support to national and 
theater decision makers, along with managing the worldwide defense warning system”.70 The 
use of JICs help to integrate the various “INTs” involved in intelligence operations as many 
agencies are utilized in support of particular “INT” operations rather than as a collective 
source of support. Currently, Joint Intelligence Centers (and Joint Operations Intelligence 
Centers- JOICs) are available at the COCOM level up to the National Joint Operations and 
Intelligence Center (NJOIC) with the COCOM JOICs integrating all DoD intelligence from 
external IC sources and defense organizations, non-governmental organizations (NGOs), and 
other Law Enforcement Agencies in order to best incorporate all assets in order to best 
provide intelligence support. Operational-level JOICs are implemented in situations in which 
a sustained operation is being conducted.71 If this level of JOIC is necessitated, it may be 
required that subject matter experts (SMEs) be deployed in ground-level support of 
operations. Furthermore, the DIA, as the largest military-based intelligence analytical 
organization and acting as the head of the JICs, has made significant advancements in 
helping to reduce duplicity and redundancy in intelligence analysis and product 
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dissemination within the military intelligence world.72 The development of the Joint Military 
Intelligence Program (JMIP), is designed to address the needs of defense-wide intelligence 
operations rather than the needs of one military branch or service.73  Large issues remain 
however, as “dividing lines between the DIA’s analytical responsibilities and those of the 
military departments remain blurred despite the agreed-on production process”.74   
 In an American Intelligence Journal study by Lou Anne DeMattei, key challenges 
that directly effect a JIOC’s operation were addressed. While the original study 
acknowledges and examines both individual and organizational issues within the JIOC, for 
the purposes of this study, focus will be on the organizational factors addressed. The primary 
challenge that was discovered within the JIOC is enveloped in the organizational 
management processes and their ability to quickly assemble task-oriented teams efficiently. 
As DeMattei points out, this aspect of intelligence operations is similar in nature to 
management functions, and the inability to “identify, apply, and develop individual skills and 
talents directly affects continuous knowledge creation… at the organizational level.”75 
 This in itself leads to issues that reduce the efficiency of the JIOC. Task-oriented 
teams in operational settings are, by nature, geographically dispersed, yet they must 
coordinate and collaborate on a regular and continuous basis. In order to achieve this, virtual 
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teaming approaches and technologies are used, yet require significant administrative 
overhead for coordination and scheduling. Often this must be coordinated through multiple 
military branches in order to offer the best data for the operational environment.76 The issue 
lies in the efficiency of the process and the lack of timeliness it contributes. This method 
does not enable on-the-spot and continuous contact and cannot be independently initiated; 
therefore, it severely limits the ability to denote the collective understanding of the team in its 
entirety. De Mattei explains the issue best, as she explains “Because JIOC operations rely 
heavily on structured, scheduled, and continuous interaction…it constrains JIOC potential to 
optimize knowledge and intelligence dissimenation, and can engender a fragmented and 
chaotic rather than integrated knowledge creation environment”, negatively affecting the 
reach back intelligence process.77 
OTHER ISSUES WITH REACH BACK INTELLIGENCE & THE USE OF JOINT 
INTELLIGENCE CENTERS  
Intelligence analysis conducted at the strategic, operational, and tactical levels (i.e. 
military intel) will, by nature, receive the burden of carrying a bad reputation for operations 
gone wrong. Ultimately, it is the Commander, not the intel officers, who are held responsible 
for the decisions and orders they make. “Bad intel” is often blamed for skewing the 
Commander’s decision; however, a couple of variables need to be kept in perspective. 
Operational decisions will often lead to second and third order effects that can be hard to 
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anticipate, especially in the realm of asymmetric threat. As General Mattis reminds us, the 
enemy always has a vote.78  
When operations go wrong, intelligence agencies, including those involved in 
military intelligence activities, becomes the perceived “catch-all” excuse to the public for 
what is really a widespread ignorance on how intelligence feeds a commander’s decision-
making process. Military intel in operations begins with the “running estimate” consisting of 
“effects of key terrain and weather, impact of civil considerations on operations, significant 
cultural factors, threat intent, threat courses of actions, etc.…79 Running estimates are 
developed by the intelligence analysts on staff and are used to help develop the battlefield. 
The intelligence preparation of the battlefield (IPB) will then be used by all other war-
fighting functions to drive their respective planning processes. A flawed IPB can doom an 
operation; yet, it is important to note that the IPB is ‘interpreted’ by operational planners for 
its effects on their war-fighting functions.  
 A specific example of this would be the establishment of a Commander’s Critical 
Information Requirements (CCIR) and how they drive priority information requirements 
(PIR).80 At the tactical level, intel analysts must focus on supporting the commander and are 
responsible for developing priority information requirements that assist in answering 
questions that will drive the commander’s decision-making process. In essence, if a 
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commander and their staff select the wrong course of action, their CCIRs will drive the intel 
analysts to develop flawed PIRs that are not answering the “right” questions. 
 While looking at data management for JICs, there are various policies and practices 
that are implemented by DST and SMEs within the organization. The primary reason for this 
is the conglomeration of personnel from a multitude of agencies in support of forward 
deployed operations. The varied training of different policies and practices to those involved 
in JICs will, by nature, create vulnerabilities in the “translation” of disseminated information 
to various military branches. This is also an important factor to note, as the various branches 
of the military also provide their own doctrine and operational procedures along with the 
implementation of joint doctrine. This can lead to further issues of translation in 
circumstances where intelligence coming from reach-back intelligence support operations is 
used. The lack of the ability to create common data sources can negatively affect plan 
capability, integration of activity, and overall access for results. The lack of knowledge of the 
systems in play within the various areas of intelligence collection and analysis can also cause 
sharing issues, creating a delay in the proper dissemination of desired intelligence from 
forward deployed units.  
INHERENT CHALLENGES TO INTELLIGENCE OPERATIONS  
There are, by nature, inherent challenges and issues that arise when any intelligence 
operations, or change to the process of these operations, are put into motion. Some of these 
challenges are related specifically to the mission set or process of the intelligence 
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community; others are challenges that face nearly all complex organizations regardless of 
their base purpose, i.e. issues within its structure.81  
Many of the issues found in intelligence operations stem from deficiencies in 
integration, which in turn lead to short comings in several aspects of the intelligence process- 
coordination, collection, analysis, information sharing, the relationship between the 
intelligence and policy communities, congressional oversight, personnel policies, and 
innovative ideas. These challenges affect infrastructure, agency administrations, and 
transparency among various IC affiliates. Many of the other issues that face intelligence 
operations stem directly from these shortcomings of the system. These same deficiencies are 
present in military intelligence operations as they are inherently similar.  
One such challenge is that of preventing the groupthink phenomena. In former 
community analyses (i.e. examination of the Iraq WMD assessments), all oversight 
committees involved pointed to the ubiquitous problem of groupthink as a major contributor 
to issues within the IC.82 This common phenomena occurs when analysts lapse too readily 
into agreement based on the vague intellectual notion of a majority.83 As mentioned 
previously, intelligence oriented organizations tend to receive the blame for failed and 
negatively perceived military operations, or other national security issues. Recommendations 
that are deemed out-of-the-box or radical are often overlooked and ignored in deference to 
more commonly agreed upon and traditional ideals; a tendency which sometimes causes 
some intelligence analysts to share more information that coincides with the desired 
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consensus views.84 This can cause important and critical intelligence data to slip through the 
cracks and is a major weakness in the current system as it is designed to protect national 
security and contributes to the inherent issues of groupthink incidents.85 
The groupthink phenomena extends past common bureaucratic avenues and into the 
world of military intelligence operations as well. The by-the-book nature of military 
operations in general create the perfect environment for groupthink to influence the 
intelligence process. Collective rationalization and stereotypes of out-groups can lead to an 
intrinsic fallacy within the military intelligence operation and the correspondence of doctrine. 
There lies a tendency amongst those in policy support operations to ‘appease the masses’ as 
the very jobs they are trusted to do are at risk if the are deemed as going against the grain. 
Self-censorship and an illusion of unanimity is facilitated through direct pressure being 
placed on dissenters by policymakers and other peoples of influence to support the standing 
of those in power. This push to conform can contribute to defective decision-making and 
faulty military intelligence operations. When exhibited to this fashion, groupthink can have a 
great and overwhelming impact on the reach back intelligence process as the intelligence  
product disseminated to those in need is faulty from the beginning, leading to a 
domino effect that will affect operations all the way down to a tactical level.  
Yet another intrinsic challenge that faces the intelligence operations and that must be 
considered when investigating options of any intelligence reform, is that of collection or 
analytical stove piping. This refers to the tendency of agencies or branches in analogous lines 
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of work to compete with one another, often to a wasteful and harmful degree.86 Stove piping 
can be further compounded through what is deemed as “stovepipes within stovepipes”, an 
aggregate competitive effect that takes place as separate programs and processes work 
independently from one another within the same discipline or branch.87 Although this is, in 
part, the natural result of the compartmentalization of various programs, it worsens the 
stovepipe issue, making cross-agency, or in the instance of military intelligence activities 
cross-branch, strategies increasingly difficult.88  
While it is acknowledged that the stovepiping issue does not impact modern-day 
military intelligence operations to the degree that groupthink does, exacerbating the 
stovepipe issue is the duplication of effort that may derive from such compartmentalization. 
It stands to reason that without joint collaboration, responses to collection and/or production 
tasks may not be systemized into one location (i.e. the JIC) leading to issues in obtaining the 
information through the reach back intelligence process. This also leads to further problems 
as individual branch intelligence units may provide different answers to the same sets of 
questions that spurred the collection of particular intelligence and adding another layer of 
stovepipe issues to the intelligence process.89 
RECOMMENDATIONS BASED ON THESE FINDINGS: 
Expanding on the idea of integration and implementing action more influential to the 
operational level in asymmetric warfare, there should be more integration amongst the 
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intelligence services of the various military branches. Currently, each branch of the Armed 
Forces has its own intelligence unit, operating to some degree under the DIA. While there is 
an overlying standard of operation guidelines disseminated to the various groups, and also 
acknowledging the expansion of the control of the DIA in recent reformation measures, each 
branch’s intelligence unit is largely left to its own devices when in actual operation, 
especially at a tactical level. This creates a void between intel units within the realms of 
language, doctrine, and other areas of importance that are not specifically outlined within the 
parameters of joint doctrine.  
While it is NOT suggested that these agencies converge into one singular cohesive 
unit, it is believed that the DIA should be given the responsibility to set more detailed, 
standardized operational and analytical techniques for collection and analysis purposes.90 Put 
simply, the DIA should be made into a central “hub” of military intelligence, beyond the 
current operational use of the JIC. Not only would this action increase the degree of sharing 
amongst the military service branches, it will also assist in the necessary “translation” of 
collected data between branches that operate of different doctrine and require them to meet a 
higher quality standard than what is currently necessitated and beyond the requirements of 
the NMJIC in its current construct.   
Policy, procedures, and overall capabilities of JICs must be studied and analyzed on a 
deeper level in order to determine the need for review and update for policies, procedures, 
technical actions for sorting, accessing, sharing, and managing intelligence data. The 
difficulty in finding studies involving the success or faults of JICs in their current state of 
                                               




affairs points to a need for this type of revamp; however, in the scope of this study, it was 
unrealistic to delve that far into discovery of solutions to the weaknesses of JICs as they 
stand. This limitation in study constraints will be further acknowledged in the suggestions for 
future research. It is currently acknowledged, however, that a complete standardization of 
intelligence and operational data, as well as a standardization of the methods of accessibility 
to such system data, between the various commands worldwide that effect and impact 
global/regional plans would help to reduce problems within JICs in their current state. It is 
also noted that the diminishment of over-classification in intelligence operations would also 
help streamline the process of reach-back support and applicable operations within JICs, 
allowing for more efficient and effective intelligence support to forward deployed military 
operations.  
In order to better understand the asymmetric adversary that our military now faces, 
there must be a stronger reliance on cultural intelligence within the joint intelligence 
doctrinal guidelines. Standard doctrine should be re-written for today’s threat, taking into 
account that a basic comprehension of all foreign peoples attributed to any joint operations 
area, regardless of times of war or peace, is fundamental as the relationships with the 
population of an area directly affects knowledge of the enemy.91 While the use of cultural 
intelligence is present in today’s intelligence products derived from JICs, the basic joint 
doctrine, as it stands, does not include the importance of cultural intelligence products in its 
operational guidelines. Guidance must be addressed in these standard principles as it places 
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many forces in foreign missions at a cultural disadvantage, causing hiccups in the operational 
result of the reach-back intelligence process. Adding and enhancing cultural intelligence to 
the JIPB process will improve both the operational analysis of space and allow combatant 
commanders to make better resulting decisions on the battlefield.92 It is important to 
remember that JFC are experts in military matters and processes, not cultural specialists; the 
JIC should be used to bridge that knowledge gap in order to boost the use of reach-back 
intelligence and its assistance in the design of successful courses of action in military 
operations on the ground.  
ISSUES TO CONSIDER IN ALL RECOMMENDATIONS: 
 As most of the aforementioned recommendations demonstrate, integration is deemed 
to be key in implementing successful intelligence reform. Yet, it does not go unnoticed that 
there are instances when a method of decentralization may operate with a better chance of 
success, especially given the fact that our more recent security threats are decentralized by 
nature as asymmetric adversaries.93 The need to coordinate the activities of the IC should not 
drive reform to create a fully centralized system. Some amount of decentralization is 
necessary as it allows for a greater miscellany of approaches and perspectives of collection 
and analysis; a critical step in the promotion of innovation and prevention of groupthink.94 
This being said, the ultimate goal of any intelligence reform should be the advancement and 
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culture of collaboration while granting individual agencies room to pursue national 
intelligence objectives in the myriad of ways.95 
LIMITATIONS OF STUDY:  
As an exploratory study investigating various areas of the intelligence and military 
relationship, the research included in this study is limited by subjectivity, the lack of 
quantifiable data, and unknown information that may affect the results within. Classification 
of documents related to the operational process of reach-back intelligence created a difficult 
hurdle when addressing this operational support system; open-source information and 
previous research reports related to the topic were used in lieu of documents that were unable 
to be accessed without proper classification status.  
One limitation derived when examining the current manifestation of the JIC is the 
little quantifiable information available publicly to point towards this approach’s possibility 
of success and/or failure. There are few accessible reports and studies available to scrutinize 
the organizational structure, policies, and procedures associated with JICs in order to 
determine fault lines of weakness. The study conducted by Lou Anne DeMattei supported 
this realization by noting on page 96 the “very limited corpus of scholarly research and 
systematic empirical evaluation”96, and the current research exhibited a shortfall of available 
information. Many studies into the JIC and its operational success were dated; some beyond 
a period of twenty years. Due to this fact, many of the suggestions were based on a subjective 
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nature rather than on objective studies, as the more current quantifiable studies are 
inaccessible without clearance. This information usually becomes public after a designated 
period of time and could contribute to the study in the future. This means that all the data 
used and collected for research purposes was either unclassified or open sourced.  
While noting these limitations, it is not believed that any conclusions or 
recommendations were negatively impacted; rather they are based on logical and conceptual 
understandings of current circumstances and pitfalls regarding intelligence and military 
operations in the fight against the asymmetric threat. These limitations are also negated in 
suggested efforts for future research.  
SUGGESTIONS FOR FUTURE RESEARCH: 
 It is recommended that each of the specific issues addressed in this paper be 
individually analyzed through further qualitative study as it is acknowledged that ‘success’ in 
the realm of intelligence operations is, by nature, a subjective study.  It is acknowledged that 
by separating the issues addressed here via a thorough and individual study, a deeper and 
more comprehensive understanding of the intelligence and military relationship would be 
made, contributing to an effective use of resources and assets in the fight against asymmetric 
adversaries. This would help to make recommendations to policy change more detailed and 
easier to codify.  It is also recommended that future studies be conducted by researchers with 
a level of credential that will allow for deeper analysis of classified information in regard to 
how each of these issues effect intelligence and military operations against the asymmetric 
threat; this will also help to decrease the level of use of open source information for a study 
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of this magnitude. This would not only assist in negating the limitations exhibited by this 
research, it will also help to increase the quality of research in future studies.  
 It is also suggested that a push for more empirical studies on the operational success 
of JICs, as well as into the current process of reach back intelligence, be supported in the 
military intelligence world. Many intelligence officers, as well as active duty military 
personnel (i.e. Warrant Officers) are required to conduct research and continue to make 
advancements and suggestions for growth in their respective fields of expertise. There is a 
need in this area for operational and organizational analysis to be conducted on the JIC in 
order to assure that action is taken to help boost its operations to the most efficient and 
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